British codes, starting with the Cadbury Report (1992), are venerable market-targeted documents that have reached an uncontestable degree of maturity. Are there any dangers behind their ‘comply or explain’ mechanism? It can be argued that the ties that bind accountability / input legitimacy / regulation together are unbreakable. A system cannot be rendered accountable unless the legitimacy it claims is founded on the integrity of the decision-making process. On the other hand, decision-making is regulated in order to prevent abuse. Governance codes can be seen as a tradeoff: they promote a system that involves output legitimacy, within a framework of accountability and strictly designed institutions. In other words, the fantasy world of governance codes is populated with enemy races – shareholders and stakeholders – fighting for supremacy. Corporate governance codes appear as politically polluted documents, comprising ambiguous and contradictory propositions. In our opinion, only the Cadbury code has come to express a unitary and judicious vision on the universe of corporate governance. The dissolution of accountability, as witnessed by the reports issued subsequently, may well be triggered by the due process of ‘public consultation’ of corporations that have feared their rights and liberties menaced by new layers of regulation.
|Keywords:||Corporate Governance, Stakeholder Theory, Financial Markets, Conceptual Framework, Accountability|
Assistant lecturer, Ph.D. student, The Department of International Accounting, The Faculty of Accounting and Management Information Systems, The Academy of Economic Studies of Bucharest, Romania
There are currently no reviews of this product.Write a Review